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Abstract
This paper presents findings from a study of the auditing character-
istics in some countries. Auditing rule diﬀerentiation among countries
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1 Introduction
In the last decade some major auditing companies have been charged with neg-
ligence in the execution of their duties. Scandals involving these firms brought
to light the fact that the main accounting control systems were ineﬀective.
The theoretical and empirical literature of accounting and business have
emphasized diﬀerent issues associated with the auditing activities and specifi-
cally conflicts of interest, fee dependence and mandatory rotations. These are
crucial aspects aﬀecting the corporate governance system in a country and the
protection of investors’ interests.
In this paper we consider how legislation in diﬀerent countries has tack-
led auditing issues by looking through audit regulations in the United States
(henceforth, the US), the United Kingdom (henceforth, the UK) and four other
European countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The idea is to cre-
ate a quality measure which captures the audit characteristics in the countries
inspected. To this end, two main steps are required. The first one is to set
up a database compiling several features of auditing for the six countries; the
second one is to apply a suitable methodology to our qualitative data to ob-
tain an audit measure. Prior to the data collection we require to identify how
auditing and its actors have been ruled by diﬀerent legislation. So, we sought
legal sources for each country investigated and then listed a set of characteris-
tics suitable to represent the auditing rule framework operating in a country.
We based the selection of attributes on the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). This
Act was issued by the US Parliament in the wake of numerous US corporate
failures and estabilished standards for all US public company boards, manage-
ment and accounting firms. Using this law, we consider several main auditing
characteristics to compare the audit regulations in the other countries. Further
we have checked these features over a period of twenty years in order to capture
the changes in the regulation. The list of attributes has been grouped into three
clusters denoted as: Supervisory Authority, Auditors’ Independence and Cor-
porate Responsibility. The first group lists key issues concerning the authority
that oversees the auditing firms’ activities. The second cluster describes several
aspects relating to Auditors’ Independence and the last group illustrates aspects
of Corporate Responsability in the auditing process. For each feature we pro-
vide a short description and legal sources. Next we explore the data collection.
By means of a multiple correspondence analysis, we describe and investigate the
evolution in the auditing legislation and make some comparisons between them.
This statistical technique allows the reduction of the listed characteristics into
a small number of attributes (latent factors). We illustrate the basic features
of this approach and then implement it with reference to the auditing dataset.
We then present the main results of the analysis.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 mentions some theoretical ques-
tions of auditing activity. Section 3 describes the auditing clusters and the
conversion to qualitative data. In Section 4 we briefly address the methodology
adopted to analyse the data. Section 5 illustrates the main results and breaks
these down for each country. The last section contains a brief review of the
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analysis.
2 Some theoretical aspects of auditing activity
An important outcome of auditing is to make corporate information available
to the financial markets through the auditors’ statements. Auditors verify and
testify to the truthfulness and correctness of financial and economic reports by
issuing a certificate. Their aim is to certify (to declare) the validity and the
accuracy of a company’s reports. This provides signals to market agents on
the reliability of results attained by firms, anabling them to make investment
decision with confidence.
Historically, the introduction of auditors for checking accounting mistakes
or irregularities was due to the development of separation of ownership and
control in companies during the 19th century. The agency theory underlines the
fact that the main concern stemmed from a possible conflict between managers
and shareholders: the audit is a mechanism introduced to minimize managers’
incentives to act in their own interests rather than those of shareholders. As
a result, the role of the auditing is to reduce contractual or transaction costs
related to asymmetric information among parties of an obligation (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Several empirical studies have verified this link and they have
shown a positive relationship between variables representing agency costs and
variables expressing audit qualification (Chow, 1982). It has also been shown
that agency costs have a significant role in the corporate decision process on
auditor selection (Francis and Wilson, 1988 and Defond, 1992).
Auditing quality depends on the ability of the auditor to carry out a careful
examination of accounts and to detect possible errors or anomalies (technical
competence) and his keenness to give an objective opinion on them (his indepen-
dence). Although this last factor is a crucial aspect, it is also diﬃcult to observe
and to measure. A broad range of theoretical and empirical literature has exam-
ined the nexus between independent judgement and auditing provisions, defining
this link in terms of fee dependence. It consists of the fee eﬀect (fee provided
by customers for audit services) on the auditor independence judgement. The
results of these studies are not consistent. For instance, Craswell, Francis and
Taylor (1995) aﬃrm that auditing firms, operating in competitive markets, pro-
vide lower audit independence judgement if they get provisions which can be
replaced. In Wines (1994), Barkess and Simnett, (1994) and Craswell and Fran-
cis (1999), assuming the hypothesis of fee dependence, they conclude that this
factor does not aﬀect auditor judgments on balance sheets. Moreover, Craswell
and Francis (1999) and Craswell et al. (1995) examine the importance of fee
dependence, considering audit firms operating at both an international and local
level. Their findings do not conclude that fee dependence is a threat to auditor
independence.
Another strand of literature studying audit quality highlights the relation-
ship between auditor accuracy and audit firm size. There are two main ap-
proaches. The first one is due to De Angelo (1981). He argues that large
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auditors have more incentive to avoid inaccurate audit reports in order to main-
tain their own reputation. In fact, if information spreads that auditing firms
issue incorrect reports, they could loose earnings because of a diminishing cust-
mer base1. The second approach takes into account the "deep pockets" model.
According to this model, large auditors have more incentive to issue correct
statements becouse otherwise they may suﬀer from an increase in the size of
the litigation penalty. In particular, Dye (1993) and Schwartz (1997) show a
positive relationship between auditor accuracy and the size of litigation penalty
in cases of negligent behaviour. Furthermore, Lennox (1999) points out that
large auditors not only have more incentive to make the right eﬀort but also
that they are more likely to be sued because of audit error accruing.
Recent financial scandals (i.e. Enron, Worldcom) have raised again the de-
bate on the quality of audit services, urging scholars to make additional com-
ments. Some contributions have emphasized the importance of the auditor
mandatory rotation.
When audit firms have a long-term relationship with their clients, this fact
may be seen as a threat to their independence. The introduction of the mecha-
nism of mandatory rotation has the aim of reducing the possibility that a client
may influence the auditor by threatening him with the revoke of the contracts.
Despite this importance, empirical research has found ambiguous results.
Arrunada and Paz Ares (1997) have analyzed the eﬀect of mandatory rotation
on audit cost and quality. Authors show that rotation increases audit cost and
price through the destruction of specific assets (i.e. customer knowledge) and
the distortion of competition. Besides, they consider that a highly plausible
eﬀect is a negative impact on quality, as a consequence of the lower technical
competence of the new auditors and ,at least in some cases, fewer incentives for
independent behaviour.
Other analyses stress the eﬀects of rotation on total audit costs. Arrunada
(2000) illustrates that mandatory rotation raises costs for both auditor and
audited firms. Mandatory rotation leads to an increase of direct implicit and
explicit costs relating to initial auditing and it give rise to an indirect eﬀect in
audit eﬃciency because of less competitive markets. Finally, the author shows
that large audit firms flatten their market share reducing competitiveness, along
with the increasing of rotation.
Recently the debate on audit quality and independence has focused on the
eﬀects of non-audit services provided by audit firms in the audit market. Audit
firms provide complementary services (non-audit services) which benefit fom
economies of scope. These are due to the provision of both the main and com-
plementary services together, along with a lower cost for providing each services.
However, empirical literature does not provide consistent results about the ef-
fects of supplying non-audit services on auditors’ independence (Craswell, 1999;
Parkash and Venable, 1993; Arrunada, 1999). The reasons for this are based on
the auditors quasi-rent, in contrast to both the specific and global quasi- rent
for client.
1Existing customers may not renew contracts and/or a lack of new customers.
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This concern arose crucially with the Enron aﬀair and similar cases where
auditing firms were involved in the financials scandals; this then created the
basis for the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002.
3 Auditing Database
In this section, we describe the information gathering process we carried out to
create the audit database. We have consulted diﬀerent legal sources for each
country included in the sample. We look at laws pertaining to auditing rules and
specifically at company laws. Company laws are part of the commercial codes
in civil law countries (France, Spain, Italy and Germany) or exist as separate
laws, mainly in the form of acts, in common law countries (US, UK).
In Table 1 we show the legal sources from which the auditing rules have
been acquired including Commercial Codes, Company Acts and Codes of Best
Practise. Prior to the data collection we selected a list of features that could
capture the quality of auditing rules in a given country. We identified these
characteristics following the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) which was passed by
the US Parliament in 2002 to overcome auditing and accounting shortcomings
arising from the financial scandals.
In the next paragraph we consider in more detail which aspects we took into
account to represent the quality of the auditing activity.
3.1 Auditing clusters
In Table 2, we present the list of characteristics selected to focus on the quality
of auditing. Each of these attributes can be thought of as a measure of an aspect
of auditing. We arrange these features into three clusters corresponding to the
basic aspects of auditing.
The first cluster is labelled “Supervisory Authority” and brings together
aspects describing the actors and tasks of this institution, as follows. Juridical
Nature of Authority defines the legal position of the authority and establishes
its entire independence from other public institutions, within the limits of the
law. Duties of the Board lists the principal duties of the authority relating to
the elimination or reduction of probable conflicts of interests. These include,
for example, the duty of holding a public accounting firms’ register. The audi-
tors are obliged to be on the register in order to practise. The authority has
to establish auditing and quality standards and professional ethics standards.
Finally, it lists another duty: the possibility of inspections and investigations on
public accounting firms’ actions. Composition refers to how the law defines the
main characteristics that each member must have to participate in the author-
ity board. Essentially, members must be chosen based on good reputation and
moral integrity. Furthermore, to respect the independence principle of mem-
bers, as characterized by Members Independence, the law bans members from
doing other professional activities. In particular, nobody can hold shares of or
be paid by a public accounting firm. The aim of this rule is to avoid any conflicts
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of interest between inspectors and the companies they are checking. Vacancies
refers to how the law provides rules to appoint a new authority board. The
legislator seeks to eliminate the possibility of a period of authority inactivity.
Powers and Rules of Authority defines whether powers are well separated from
the duties of the authority. Some of the most important of these are the powers
to: i) sue and be sued, to complain and to defend itself in judicial court; ii)
manage the money of public funds as it sees fit respecting the budgetary limits;
iii) accept gifts or donations and iv) enter into contracts, execute instruments,
incur liabilities, and do any and all other acts and things necessary to the con-
duct of its operations. Registration with the Authority, the law provides that
public accounting firms are obliged to be entered on the public register held by
the authority. In this way, the authority can control the independence and qual-
ifications of auditors. Auditing and Quality Control Standards imply that the
authority has the right to establish both auditing standards and both quality
and ethics principles. Public accounting firms have to follow these standards
in order to continue to work. Independence Standards and Rules: according
to this attribute, the authority establishes such rules as may be necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
In particular, shareholders protection becomes tougher with the analysis of
Inspections of Registered Public Accounting Firms. The supervisory authority
is able to conduct an inspection identifying any act, practise or omission that is
in violation of the law or auditing standards. Moreover, the authority can begin
a formal investigation or take appropriate disciplinary action, if necessary, with
respect to any violations.
If a public accounting firm is unjustly inspected and is subjected to unfair
disciplinary actions, the law provides the possibility to sue another authority in
the judical court. This is included in Authority Review.
Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings: the law establishes that the
authority may conduct an investigation of any act or practice or omission by a
registered public accounting firm that may violate rules or standards relating
to the preparation and issuance of audit reports. Moreover, the authority may
impose some disciplinary measures or sanctions such as temporary suspension
or permanent revocation of registration or limitation on activities, functions, or
operations of such firm or person.
Applicability to Foreign Public Accounting Firms. This provides the pos-
sibility that national rules may be applied to foreign public accounting firms
operating in the country.
Finally, Oversight of Supervision Authority establishes that another institu-
tion exists with the power of control on audit authority’s actions.
The second cluster relates to several aspects of the auditors’ indepen-
dence. We consider the features of independence of auditors with respect to
certified firms. The first element concerns the Prohibited Activities. These
summarise all activities that a public accounting firm can or cannot do if it is
engaged to perform an audit. Among diﬀerent prohibited activities, we can con-
sider: i) bookkeeping or other services related to accounting records or financial
statements of the audit client; ii) giving financial information or acting as broker
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or dealer or supplying investment banking services; iii) oﬀering internal audit
outsourcing services; iv) submitting legal and expert services unrelated to the
audit. Audit Partner Rotation: the law provides directly that the appointment
of a public accounting firm cannot be renewed an unlimited number of times.
Finally, Conflicts of Interest prohibs a registered public accounting firm to
perform any audit service, if a chief executive oﬃcer, controller, chief financial
oﬃcer or chief accounting oﬃcer is employed by that registered independent
public accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the audit of that
listed firm.
In the final cluster, referred to as “Corporate responsibility”, we take
into account features related to the responsibilities of internal audit committee
and of each member the board of directors. Audit Committees: this identifies
responsibilities of the internal audit committee. Furthermore, the majority of
the committee’s members must be independent from the board, in which they
can participate on a purely advisory basis.
Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports of National and Foreign Firms
summarizes the responsibilities of the board with respect to financial and eco-
nomic statements. The law provides that balance sheets have to be accompa-
nied by a written statement by the chief executive oﬃcer and the chief financial
oﬃcer. This report has to certify the truthfulness and completeness of the
information in balance sheets.
Improper influence on Conduct of Audits: it is an illegal act for any oﬃcer
or director of an issuer, to take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce,
manipulate, or mislead any independent public accounting firm, which is en-
gaged in the performance of an audit of financial statements for the purpose of
rendering such financial statements materially misleading.
CEO and CFO reimburse the Issuer due to non-compliance of financial re-
ports. This considers the possibility that the chief executive oﬃcer and the
chief financial oﬃcer of the issuer have to reimburse the issuer for any bonus
or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received, in the case of
their misconduct.
3.2 Measuring audit characteristics
Since our purpose is to compare audit regulations across countries, we first turn
each of the audit rules (listed in table 2) into qualitative variables. To this aim,
we create variables which assume value 1 if the specific auditing rule is present
in the country legislation and zero otherwise. We obtain a matrix of binary
variables called an indicator matrix. We repeat this exercise for each year of
the sample period from 1980 to 2002, giving a total indicator matrix which
consists of 132 rows (22 years times 6 countries) and 22 columns (qualitative
variables). The total matrix represents our auditing database. This simple
measurement method avoids the needs for a discretionary weighting, such as
scores for each country, and allows us to apply a statistical methodology which
compares countries with respect to auditing regulations. In the next section we
briefly describe this procedure before applying it to our dataset.
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4 Data Analysis
In examining our database we expect to capture countries’ peculiarities. Multi-
variate statistical methods provide descriptive and explorative approaches able
to inspect data and to aid the identification of a profile of the country audit
legislation over time.
Among these methods, correspondence analysis (CA) is accurate for the
study of qualitative data and has added features of not assuming an underlying
distribution and not hypothesising a model for the data (Greenacre, 1984)2.
This procedure allows an overview of the fundamental relationships among the
variables and removes irrelevant information. Moreover it can display results in
graphic form and is easy to interpret.
In the following paragraph we describe the CA method and we refer to the
appendix for a more thorough description.
4.1 Methodology
In broad terms, correspondance analysis explores the structure of associations
among a set of qualitative variables and brings out underlying dimensions which
can be interpreted as latent variables. To illustrate this, let us assume, for
instance, that a contingency table hasm rows and k columns, each row and each
column in the table representing one modality of the corresponding variable.
We can assume that the m values of rows in the kth column can be considered
as coordinates of the point in an m-dimensional space which summarize all
information about the similarities betweeen the rows 3. The CA technique
consists of reducing the dimensional space in which to place points in such a
way that most of the information about the diﬀerences between the rows is
retained. The dimensions of the lower space define the number of axes. Each
axis of the new space represents a "synthesis" of several piece of information of
the initial space. These axes must be interpreted according to the modalities
that have contributed to their definition the most, in order to give a meaning
to the graphical solution provided. The amount of information retained in all
dimensions of the new space is called total inertia.
In the graphical solution, the locations of all modalities of the variables can
be compared to each other: short distances imply high similarities and grater
distances high dissimilarities.
A simple correspondence analysis is applied to a single contingency table.
When we have a multivariate phenomenon then a multiple correspondence
analysis (MCA) is required. This latter technique is in fact the appropriate
method in this case.
An appropriate way to treat a multidimentional analysis is to convert data
into an indicator matrix. This matrix has each observational unit (in our case,
2See also, Greenacre (1995) and Greenacre and Blasius (1995).
3 In the same and symmetric way we can investigate the similarities between columns. This
is the core of the Dual Problem: considering both rows or columns we get analogous results
(see appendix for more details).
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countries for each year) in the rows and each variable (with its own modalities)
located in the columns. Hence, value 1 is assigned to each modality in which
a country is placed. It can be showed that Multi-Correspondence analys is the
CA procedure applied to an indicator matrix.
In this part of the paper, we summarize conceptually several rules for inter-
preting results, refering to the appendix for analytical explanation.
By applying the MCA methodology we can obtain some important informa-
tion.
The first item relates to a quality measure indicating as a percentage, to
what extent the chosen dimensions explain the total inertia. In this way we
measure the information lost when reducing the dimentional space. It may be
interpreted as the percentage of variance explained by the chosen axes.
Another item of information indicates to what extent each variable or indi-
vidual contributes to the inertia explained by each dimension. This allows us
to assess the contribution of each variable or individual to the axis orientation.
The co-ordinates of variables or individuals are also considered with respect to
the dimensions.
5 Description of the results
The results of the multi-correspondence analysis are presented in two steps.
The first one consists of interpreting the extracted axes. Then, we consider the
position of the countries within the reduced dimensional space.
Primarily, we introduce the general outcomes of the analysis which are re-
ported in table 3. This shows the decomposition of inertia with respect to the
principal axes and contains the eigenvalues of the matrix. Each axis accounts
for a part of the inertia, and it is also expressed as a percentage.
Figure 1 displays the histogram of the inertia expressed by each axis which
may be interpreted as its own percentage of explained variance. The outcomes
show that the first principal axis explains about half of the total variance and
the two first axes together express two thirds of the total variance. The first
dimension explains 48.44% of the total inertia. The second one accounts for
16.21% for a total of 64.65%. We consider this cumulative inertia adequate
to summarize the information retained from the original space. Therefore we
will only interpret these axes. This result is particularly interesting because we
considerably reduce the dimensions of the space while preserving most of the
relevant information.
Figure 2 presents the first two principal axes produced by an MCA of the
data. In this “map” all the countries have been projected according to their
co-ordinates on the two first dimensions. All countries are represented here as
points in the plane. The co-ordinates of the countries are calculated on the basis
of values assegned to the profile of attributes that describe each axis.
The plane has been constructed in such a way that the maximum “diﬀerence”
or “contrast” has been created, with regard to attribute profiles, between those
countries situated on the right-hand side of the plane and those on the left-
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hand side. This is the first, the horizontal dimension. Similarly, the second
largest possible “diﬀerence” with regard to attribute profile, is represented by
the “diﬀerence” or “contrast” between the countries situated in the top part of
the plane, and those at the bottom. This second, vertical dimension, represents
this diﬀerence.
We observe that countries assembled in the same group (points close to each
other) are characterized by homogeneity of attributes.
5.1 Interpretation of the principal axes
We shall now examine the characteristics of the extracted two principal axes.
The presentation is organized around one graph and tables that contain the
basic results for each of the axes.
Axis one
The first column of table 4 shows the modalities of the variables describing
the first axis. These modalities come from both the Supervisory and Auditors
Independence cluster. Looking at these aspects we can define the first dimension
as Degree of Regulation Guarantees. The label applied to the axis means that
the information it summarizes is related to the definition of rules which specify
the supervisory and auditing activities. Indeed some modalities concern rules
about standards of auditing and quality control, some are related to powers and
duties of the authority and others consider rules about features on auditors’
independence with respect to the certified firms. Therefore the position of a
country relative to this axis allows an evaluation of whether a country’s legisla-
tion assures investors’ protection through clear rules that regulate contents and
actors involved in auditing activities. To understand the information summa-
rized in this first axis, we first decribe the orientatation of the axis. In Figure
2 all positive values identify the absence of the modalities which characterize
the dimension, while negative values identify their presence. The first axis is
represented by the horizontal line in which groups of countries located in the
right-hand part of the first axis show a lower degree of regulation guarantees
with respect to those on the left-hand side. Countries that have similar modal-
ities are represented by points close to each other. Moreover a country that has
changed its legislation over time in favour of a better regulation is shown on the
first axis with points moving from the right to the left-hand side.
Axis two
Let us turn to the interpretation of the second principal axis extracted in the
multiple correspondence analysis of the variables. In Figure 2 the second axis is
represented by the vertical line and the main results are given in the Table 5. In
this axis we find a measure which indicates whether a regulatory environment
is more inclined towards the agency issues. The elements that identify this
axis mainly concern corporate and auditor responsibility. They are related to
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rules that incentivize the agents (auditors or firms) to act in the best interest
of investors. For this reason we denote the axis as Degree of prevention of the
agency problem. In Figure 2, groups of countries that are located in the top
part of the second axis show a lower degree of prevention of the agency problem
with respect to those in the bottom part. Therefore a country that has changed
its legislation over time in favour of better prevention rules is shown with points
moving from the top to the bottom part.
Country Results
Now we turn to the analysis of the position of countries on the above two
dimensions. Primarly, we consider the location on the first axis. Figure 2 shows
the position of each country in the period considered and allows us to track its
auditing rules history. It is clear from first glance at the graph that there is a
marked distinction between two groups of countries. Those placed on the left-
hand side on the graph have a tendency to a high degree of regulation guarantees
while for those on the right the converse is true.
The outcomes of the analysis reveal that Germany is located on the left-hand
side of the axis throughout the period, illustrating that its legislation has taken
auditing rules into account as part of the investors’ protection arrangement.
Its regulation focuses on characteristics concerning the supervision activity of
the authority and some elements that intend to assure auditors’ independence.
From 2001 it also takes into consideration aspects related to the corporate re-
sponsibility, especially responsibility for financial reports and improper influence
on auditors. Spain has also given attention to the audit regulatory environment,
as confirmed by a shifting of its location relative to the axes through the years.
It has demonstrated a high degree of regulation of auditing activities concerning
the three actors involved, auditors, firms and the supervisory body since 1986.
A further improvement was regarding prohibited auditor activities, has been in
force since 1998.
The French system is positioned on the right side of the first axis which is
characterized by inadequate precence of regulation guarantees, over the observed
period. The Supervision activity does not provide suﬃcient auditing or indepen-
dence standards, or rules regarding corporate responsibility. The French system
appears to be less inclined to revise its regulatory environment; rather, there is
currently a greater attention on auditing activity, although an improvement in
audit partner rotation has been in place since 1996.
Turning to the Italian location, the chart indicates a jump from the right
to the left side on the first axis. This is due to a new arrangement involving
auditing activity rules was made law in 1998.
The United States is placed on the left side of the first dimension from the
time when the Sarbanes Oxley Act was passed in 2002. Relative to previous
years, the law addresses further concerns regarding the supervisory issues of the
auditing activities and corporate responsibility for financial reports. The UK
is also situated wholly on the right hand side of the first dimension and any
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development have tended not to make progress regarding regulation guarantees.
However, this appears to be consistent with most common law systems.
Countries that contribute more to the second dimension, are those stressing
aspects of the audit rules related to ties between auditing and the audited firm.
Countries plotted on the top part of the diagram are diﬀerentiated from the
others in terms of limited prevention of the agency problems. Interestingly,
Italy and Germany contribute to the formation of the axis, characterizing it as
having almost no regulation regarding the degree of prevention of the problem
of conflict of interest. Moreover, the UK plays a significant role in the formation
of the bottom part of the second dimension.
Describing the judicial aspects of these changes is not the aim of this article.
However, we report the list of the main laws and regulations that have been
passed by each country in the Table 3. This helps to illustrate which changes
in national legislation relate to the above descriptions.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to explore by means of the MCA the evolution of
auditing legislation across countries.
To this end, we set up a unique dataset looking through national auditing
rules over two decades. The main results of the analysis allow us to define two
matters of interest focused on national legislation. The first one is the Degree
of regulation guarantee represented by the primary dimension extracted by the
MCA. The next is the Degree of prevention of agency problems represented by
the second axis.
Looking at the position of the countries on these axes, we can basically
divided them into two groups. We observe that for countries such as Italy, Spain
and the USA, the attention to regulation guarantee has shifted considerably over
time, in terms of auditing framework. This is in contrast to the trends in France
and the UK.
Prevention of agency problem is an issue where the UK diﬀers significantly
over time compared with France, Italy and Germany.
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Table 1 Source of country audit legislation 
COUNTRIES LAWS: 
FRANCE 
Commercial Code 1807  
Le Plan Comptable Général 1983 
Legge del 24 luglio 1966 n. 537  
SPAIN 
Royal Legislative Decree n. 1564 Stock Corporation Law of 22 
December 1989 
Act on Auditing n. 19 of 12th July 1988 
Royal Decree n. 302 Organic Structure of the Accounting and 
Auditing Institute of 17th March 1989 
The Governance Code of Listed Companies of 26 February 1998 
Codice volontario di Corporate Governance 
GERMANY 
German Stock Corporation Law (AktG) 1965 
Commercial Code (HGB) from 1897 
Law of Regulating the Profession of Auditor (WPO) 1961 
German Act of Corporate Control and Transparency (KonTraG) 
1998 
Codice volontario di Corporate Governance 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 
Companies Act 1985 modified in 1989 
Companies Directors Disqualifications Act 1986 
Code of Best Practise:  
Hampel Report 1998 
Cadbury Code 1992 
ITALY 
Codice Civile 
L. 216/1974 
Dlgs. 58/1998 (Draghi law) 
Dlgs. 2002  
Codice di autodisciplina delle società quotate 
 
 
USA Securities Exchange Act 1934 sec. 3 Sarbanes- Oxley Act 2002 
 
Table 2: List of audit characteristics 
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY INDICATOR AUDITORS INDEPENDENCE INDICATOR
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
INDICATOR
∼ Juridical nature of authority ∼ Prohibited Activities ∼ Audit Committees: responsibility and independence 
∼ Duties of the Board ∼ Audit Partner Rotation ∼ Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports of National and Foreign Firms 
∼ Composition ∼ Conflicts of Interest ∼ Improper influence on Conduct of Audits 
∼ Members Independence  ∼ CEO and CFO reimburse the Issuer due to non-compliance of financial reports 
∼ Vacancies 
  
∼ Powers and Rules of Authority 
∼ Registration with the Authority 
∼ Auditing Standards 
∼ Quality Control Standards 
∼ Independence Standards and Rules 
∼ Inspections of Registered Public Accounting Firms 
∼ Authority Review 
∼ Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings 
∼ Applicability to Foreign Public Accounting Firms 
∼ Oversight of Supervision Authority 
 
Table 3 Decomposition of Inertia 
Number 
of axes 
Eigen 
values Percentage 
Cumulative 
percentage 
1 0.4844 48.44 48.44 
2 0.1621 16.21 64.65 
3 0.1407 14.07 78.71 
4 0.1039 10.39 89.10 
5 0.0532 5.32 94.43 
6 0.0258 2.58 97.01 
7 0.0107 1.07 98.08 
8 0.0073 0.73 98.81 
9 0.0050 0.50 99.31 
10 0.0030 0.30 99.61 
11 0.0020 0.20 99.81 
12 0.0011 0.11 99.93 
13 0.0007 0.07 100.00 
14 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
15 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
16 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
17 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
18 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
19 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
20 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
21 0.0000 0.00 100.00 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 HISTOGRAM OF THE INERTIA EXPRESSED BY EACH AXIS 
 
 

Table 4  Description of the Axis 1 
Label of attributes Modality 
Auditing Standards Present 
Independence Standards and Rules Present 
Quality Control Standards Present 
Inspections of Registered Public 
Accounting Firms Present 
Audit Partner Rotation Present 
Oversight of Supervision Authority Present 
Conflicts of Interest Present 
Registration with the Authority Present 
Duties of the Board Present 
Authority Review Present 
Powers and Rules of Authority Present 
Z O N E   C E N T R A L E 
Powers and Rules of Authority Absent 
Authority Review Absent 
Duties of the Board Absent 
Registration with the Authority Absent 
Conflicts of Interest Absent 
Oversight of Supervision Authority Absent 
Audit Partner Rotation Absent 
Independence Standards and Rules Absent 
Quality Control Standards Absent 
Inspections of Registered Public 
Accounting Firms Absent 
Auditing Standards Absent 
 
 
Table 5  Description of the Axis 2 
Label of attributes Modality 
Improper influence on Conduct of Audits Present 
Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports  Present 
Audit Committees: responsibility and independence Present 
Composition Absent 
Registration with the Authority Absent 
Independence Members Absent 
Vacancies Absent 
Duties of the Board Present 
Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings Present 
Conflicts of Interest Present 
Prohibited Activities Absent 
Z O N E   C E N T R A L E 
Prohibited Activities Present 
Conflicts of Interest Absent 
Investigations and Disciplinary Proceedings Absent 
Duties of the Board Absent 
Vacancies Present 
Independence Members Present 
Registration with the Authority Present 
Composition Present 
Audit Committees: responsibility and independence Absent 
Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports  Absent 
Improper influence on Conduct of Audits Absent 
 
Table 6: Values of Axis 1 by country 
Years USA France Germany Italy Spain UK 
1980 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1981 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1982 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1983 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1984 0.84 0.62 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.83 
1985 0.84 0.43 -0.85 0.32 0.83 0.42 
1986 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1987 0.84 0.43 -0.85 0.32 -0.57 0.42 
1988 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1989 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1990 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.24 
1991 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.24 
1992 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1993 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1994 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1995 0.84 0.23 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1996 0.84 0.16 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1997 0.84 0.16 -0.85 0.32 -0.96 0.09 
1998 0.84 0.03 -0.85 -0.83 -1.05 0.09 
1999 0.84 0.03 -0.85 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
2000 0.84 0.03 -0.85 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
2001 0.84 0.03 -1.01 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
2002 -1.09 0.03 -1.01 -0.98 -1.05 0.09 
 
 
Table 7: Values of Axis 2 by country 
Years USA France Germany Italy Spain UK 
1980 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.60 0.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.60 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.60 0.00 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.60 0.00 0.00 
1984 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.60 0.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.14 -0.18 -0.60 0.00 0.39 
1986 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1987 0.00 0.14 -0.18 -0.60 -0.26 0.39 
1988 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1989 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1990 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.57 
1991 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.57 
1992 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1993 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1994 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1995 0.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1996 0.00 -0.08 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1997 0.00 -0.08 -0.18 -0.60 0.15 0.91 
1998 0.00 -0.11 -0.18 -0.49 0.09 0.91 
1999 0.00 -0.11 -0.18 -0.14 0.09 0.91 
2000 0.00 -0.11 -0.18 -0.14 0.09 0.91 
2001 0.00 -0.11 0.17 -0.14 0.09 0.91 
2002 0.12 -0.11 0.17 -0.14 0.09 0.91 
 
7 APPENDIX
The purpose of this appendix is to present a theoretical review of the tech-
nique applied for the derivation of the auditing index. The Multicorrespondence
analysis (MCA) is the appropriate method to analyse our dataset.
The starting point should be the examination of the correspondence analy-
sis4 (henceforth, CA). Since the equations that defines CA can be derived in
many diﬀerent ways5 (De Leeuw,1983 ), we decide to explain it in terms of the
equivalent approach denoted as canonical correlation analysis (CCA). Then we
get the Multiple correspondence analysis as a particular case of the generalized
canonical correlation analysis.
The correspondence analysis and the canonical correlation analysis have
many parallels with the principal-components analysis (PCA), and so we re-
quire to introduce it, shortly.
7.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPAL COM-
PONENTS ANALYSIS
The main idea behind PCA is to replace a set of variables with a smaller number
of variables that are not correlated and have maximum variance.
Let Y denote an n × p matrix whose element ij is given by yij and that
contains n units and p variables. Let yi = (yi1,yi2,..., yip,) be a vector that
consists of p variables associated at unit i, with i = 1, . . . . . . , n. Let y˜j =
(y1j,y2j,..., ynj,) be a vector that consists of n-units associated at variable j. Let
us consider that n-units and p-variables are elements of an Euclidean vector
space. Then yi is a vector defined in a p-dimensional space, Rp and y˜j is a
vector defined in n—dimensional space, Rn.
Let a1, ....ap be the canonical basis that define the p-dimensional space. Each
vector yi can be defined as the linear combination of the basis vectors with
coeﬃcients yi1,yi2,..., yip,: yi = yi1a1+yi2a2+....+yipap Let y¯ be the centroid, or
mean vector, of y1....yn defined as the linear combination y¯ = α1y1+ ....+αnyn
where the coeﬃcients add up to 1:
P
αi = 1.
Let us suppose to represent the cloud of vectors yi (i=1,. . . . . . ,n) in a lower
K∗ dimensional subspaceQ. Over the sub space, the vectors yi, y1....yn, should
maintain as much as possible the informative power of the original space. Geo-
metrically it means that the vectors y1....yn should be projected over the sub-
space Q trying to keep the original distance among them. The choices fall over
the spaces of lower dimensionality which come closest to the set of original vec-
tors . A way to identify the subspace is to minimize the distance between each
vector yi and its projection yˆi on the K∗ dimensional subspace Q.
4We refer to the extensive discussion in the books by Greenacre (1984) and by Labart,
Morineau and Piron (2000) to write this methodological appendix.
5Historical reviews are, for instance, in De Leeuw (1983) and Benzecri (1982). There are
two main approaches to the CA: the French approach and the Anglo approach. Respect to the
former, initiated by Benzecri around 1965, CA is a form of metric multidimensional scaling.
To the second, CA is considered as optimal scoring (scaling) approach.
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If yi is weighted by a mass wi then our definition of the closeness of the
whole set of vectors in the subspace Q is: Ψ (Q;y1....yn) ≡
P
wid2i (a.1.1)
where d2i ≡ (yi − yˆi)
0
Ds(yi − yˆi) and Ds is the diagonal matrix of the weights
assigned to the p original dimensions6.
The squared distance d2i depends on the subspace Q and our objective is to
find the optimal subspace Q∗ which minimizes the function Ψ (Q;y1....yn).
It can be shown (Greenacre, 1984) that the optimalK∗-dimensional subspace
Q∗ is that minimize the function Ψ (Q;y1....yn) and must contain the mean
vector y¯.
The theoretical solution to the problem of minimization for any specified
dimensionality K* is embodied in the concepts of singular value decomposition
(henceforth denoted by SVD) and low rank matrix approximation.
Let Y denote an n× p matrix of rank K, the equation for ordinary SVD of
Y is the following:
Y = UDαV 0 with U 0U = I = V 0V i.e. Y =
PK
k αkukv
0
k (a.1.2)
where U is an n×K matrix, D is an K ×K diagonal matrix with elements
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ .... ≥ αn ≥ 0, and V is a K × p matrix. The K columns of
orthonormal n-vectors u1, u1, ......, uK of U , called the left singular vectors, are
an orthonormal basis for the columns of Y and are the eigenvectors of Y Y 0, with
associated eigenvalues α21, ....., α
2
K . Similarly the K columns of orthonormal p-
vectors of v1, v1, ......, vK , called the right singular vectors, are orthonormal basis
for the (transposed) rows of Y and are the eigenvectors of Y Y 0, with the same
associated eigenvalues α21, ....., α
2
K . The element α1, α2, ...., αK of the diagonal
matrix Dα are called the singular values of Y .
The matrix F ≡ UDα contains the coordinates of the rows of Y with respect
to the basis vectors in V and the matrix G ≡ V Dα contains the coordinates of
the columns of Y with respect to the basis vectors in U .
In fact the matrix Y can be written as Y = FV 0, then the i− th row yi of Y
can be written as: yi =
PK
k fikvk (a.1.3). So that the i− th row of F contains
the coordinates of yi with respect to the basis vectors in V . If the last terms
of (a.1.2) corresponding to the smallest singular values are dropped then a least
squares approximation of the matrix Y results. That is, if we define the matrix
Y[K∗] as the first K∗ terms of (a.1.2): Y[k∗] =
PK∗
k αkukv
0
k (a.1.4) then Y[k∗]
minimizes: kY −Ak2 ≡Pni Ppj (yij − aij)2 (a.1.5) amongst all n×p matrices A
of rank at most K∗. Y[K∗] is called the rank K∗ (least squares) approximation
of Y .
The rows and the column of Y[K∗] are vectors contained in subspaces of
dimension K∗ which best fit the rows and the columns of Y in the sense of
minimum sum of squared Euclidean distances. This solves the problem of mini-
mizing the loss (a.1.1), that is the ordinary principal components analysis, when
w1 = ..... = wn = 1 and Dp = Ip.
Now let us consider the problem of minimization in presence of mass and
dimension weight, this define the generalized principal components analysis.
6This type of distance function is often referred to as a diagonal metric.
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Let us consider a n × p matrix Y˜ of the deviation of Y from the mean
vector y¯: Y˜ ≡ Y − 1y¯. It can be decomposed as: Y˜ = NDµM0 (a.1.6) where
N0ΩN =M0ΦM = I, Ω and Φ being prescribed positive definite symmetric
matrices. We denote this the generalized singular value decomposition in the
metrics Ω and Φ.
Let us now set Ω=Dw the masses and Φ=Ds the dimension weights.
Then the matrix : Y˜[K∗] = N[K∗]Dµ[K∗]M 0[K∗] =
PK∗
k µknkm
0
k, (a.1.7) min-
imizes:
°°°Y˜ −A°°°2 ≡ Pni Ppj wisj (y˜ij − aij)2 = Pni wi (y˜i − ai)0Ds (y˜i − ai)
(a.1.8) amongst all n × p matrices A of rank at most K∗, where y˜i.and ai are
the rows of Y˜ and A respectively. From the form of the optimum, Y˜[K∗], the
columns vectors m1,m2, .....,mK∗ of M[K∗] define the Φ-orthonormal basis for
the optimal subspace Q∗. The coordinates of the vectors yi− y¯ with respect to
this base are the rows of F[K∗] ≡ N[K∗]Dµ[K∗](a.1.9).
The generalized SVD provides the required solution for any prescribed di-
mensionality K∗. Let us suppose to represent the vectors y1, ......,yn in a sub-
space at one dimension K∗ = 1, geometrically along a straight line. It means
that the first singular vectors and the associated singular values (the largest)
provide the optimal solution. If we want to represent the vectors y1, ......,yn
over a plane (K∗ = 2), it means that the first and the second pairs singular
vectors and associated singular values provide the optimal solution. In general,
we could obtain K basis vectors, defined as principal axes of the rows of Y.
The squared singular values give an idea of how well the matrix is represented
along the principal axes. The total variation of a matrix Y˜ is quantified by
its squared norm,
°°°Y˜°°°2
DsDw
≡
Pn
i wiy˜
0
iDsy˜i =
PK
k µ
2
k (a.1.8). Similarly the
total variation of the approximation Y˜[K∗] is:
°°°Y˜[K∗]°°°2
DsDw
=
PK∗
k µ
2
k and the
unexplained variation is
°°°Y˜ − Y˜[K∗]°°°2
DsDw
=
PK∗
k=K∗+1 µ
2
k which is minimized.
Since, y˜i = yi − y¯ (a.1.2) is the weighted sum of squared distances of the
vectors yi from their centroid y¯, a type of generalized variance which is defined
inertia of the set of the vectors , or total inertia. Because the total inertia is
the sum of the squared singular values of Y, the kth principal axis accounts for
an amount µ2k of the total inertia. Hence, the total inertia is decomposed along
the principal axes.
In order to compute the generalized SVD of the matrix a general procedure
is to pursue the following steps. Let us consider B = D1/2w Y˜D
1/2
s . Then find
the ordinary SVD of B : B = UDµV0. Let N = D
−1/2
w U, M = D
−1/2
s V ,
Dµ = Dα. Hence, Y˜ =NDµM0 is the generalized SVD (Greenacre, 1984).
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7.2 CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this section we shall describe the geometry of canonical correlation analysis7
(henceforth, CCA) as equivalent approach to correspondence analysis8 . It can
be shown that to carry out the correspondence analysis of a contingency table is
equivalent to find the canonical correlation of the disjunctive matrices associated
to (Saporta, 1990).
Then we shall consider the generalisation of the method proposed by Carrol
(1968) in order to show that the multiple correspondence analysis is a particular
case.
Let Z ≡ [Z1;Z2] be a matrix of dimension I × J which is divided into two
blocks Z1 and Z2 of J1 and J2 variables respectively, such that J = J1+ J2.
The object of CCA is to capture the correlations between two sets of vari-
ables. It tries to find basis vectors for two sets of variables such that the linear
correlations between the projections onto these basis vectors are mutually max-
imized.
Formally it can be expressed as finding linear combinations u = Z1a and
u = Z2b of each set of variables which have maximum correlation (9 . The max-
imum number of correlations that it can be found is equal to the minimum of
the columns dimension J1 and J2. A complete analysis consists of identifying
further linear combinations uk = Z1ak and vk = Z2bk each uncorrelated with
previous linear combinations u1...uk−1 and v1...vk−1, which have maximum cor-
relation. If J1 6 J2, it can be identified at most k = J1 canonical correlations (k,
k = 1, ....J1 in descending order. The vectors u1...uk and v1...vk and are called
canonical score vectors to which corresponds a1, .....ak and b1, .....bk canonical
weights. The correlation between the canonical score vectors u and v is given
by ( = (a0S12b) / [(a0S11a) (b0S22b)]
1/2 (a2.1.1) where S12 is the covariance ma-
trices between Z1 and Z2, S11 and S22 are the covariance matrices of Z1 and of
Z1 respectively.
The first problem is finding the vectors of canonical weights that maxi-
mize equation (a2.1.1) above. It can be shown that the vectors ak and bk
of canonical weights can be obtained from the left and right singular vec-
tors of the matrix S−1/211 S12S
−1/2
22 Specifically, if the SVD of the matrix is
S−1/211 S12S
−1/2
22 = WD(X
0 with W 0W = X 0X = I (a2.2.2) then the singular
values of the diagonal of D( are the canonical correlations, while the matrices
A ≡ [a1....aK ] and B ≡ [b1....bK ] of canonical weights are simply A=S−1/211 W
and B=S−1/222 X.
The orthonormality of the singular vectors of W and X stated in (2.2.2)
7Canonical corelation analysis was introduced originally by Hotelling (1936).
8The geometry of canonical correlation is given by Greenacre (1984, section 4.4).
9Note that the correlation coeﬃcient ρ only provides a measure of the linear association
between the two sets of variables: when the two sets of variables are uncorrelated, i.e., when
their correlation coeﬃcient is zero, this only means that no linear function describes their
relationship. A quadratic relationship or some other non-linear relationship are not ruled out.
19
implies that A and B are standardized as follows: AS11A = BS22B = I (a2.2.3).
This is a standardization that allows the vectors of canonical scores to be of unit
variance (and uncorrelated).Thus (2.2.3) is a set of identification conditions on
the scale of the canonical weights and equivalently of the canonical scores in
each uk and vk.
In order to identify the origins of the vectors of canonical scores, their means
are conventionally set to zero, which is equivalent to each variable (i.e. column)
of Z1 and Z2 being centred with respect to its mean.
In case of data coded as a bivariate indicator matrix the application of CCA
to such data breaks down because the covariance matrices S11, S22 are singulars
which implies that they cannot be inverted.
In fact if we let r and c be the vectors of the means of the columns of Z1 and
Z2, respectively, Dr and Dc and be diagonal matrices of r and c respectively,
then the covariance matrices are simply: S11 = Dr − rr0, S22 = Dc − cc0 and
are of ranks (J1 − 1) and (J2 − 1) respectively. We can use one of a number
of generalized inverses to carry the classical theory through. In this particular
situation it turns out that the complete solution to the problem is contained in
the CCA of the data without prior centring of the columns of Z1 and Z2. Vari-
ances and covariances are defined with respect to the origin (not the mean) and
the analysis yields a trivial maximum solution where the canonical correlation
is one and associated canonical weight vectors are ones ( J1 vectors of ones and
J1 vectors of ones), after which the canonical solutions are those of the centred
problem. Here the non trivial solutions are centred and thus identified with
respect to the origin by virtue of their uncorrelation with the trivial solution.
We can describe the geometry of CC in two diﬀerent equivalent ways. The
first way of describing CC is to think of the columns of Z1 and Z2 as points in
I-dimensional Euclidean space.
In the case of quantitative data the columns of Z1 and Z2 are centred, which
means that they have been projected orthogonally onto the (I − 1) dimensional
subspace orthogonal to 1. The set of all linear combinations of the columns
of Z1 and of Z2 form J1 and J2 dimensional subspaces respectively, and the
cosine of the angle between any two vectors is equal to their correlation. Hence
CCA is the search for any two vectors, u and v, in these respective subspaces,
which subtend the smallest angle. The procedure is repeated in the (J1 − 1)
and (J2 − 1)— dimensional subspaces orthogonal to the canonical score vectors
u and v to obtain a second canonical correlation and score vectors. Clearly,
if J1 6 J2 then we would eventually end up with a set of J1 canonical score
vectors in each subspace, the first set explaining all J1 dimensions of the column
space Z1, while the second set leaves J2−J1 dimensions of the column space of
Z2 unexplained. In this framework the correlations between the new canonical
variables and the original variables are simply the angle cosines between the
canonical score vectors and the columns of Z1 and Z2.
When Z1 and Z2 are indicator matrices, the vector 1, being the sum of the
columns of Z1, and likewise of Z2, is common to both subspaces. If we centre
the columns, that is we project onto the subspace orthogonal to 1, would reduce
the dimensionality of each subspace and we would not be able to identify the
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score vectors in this lost dimension. If we omit centring the columns, the highest
canonical correlation is 1, when u and v are both collinear with the vector 1 and
thus subtend a zero angle. This is the trivial solution. Subsequent canonical
score vectors are orthogonal to 1 in each subspace, and are thus centred as
required. If J1 6 J2, there will be only (J1 − 1) non-trivial canonical correlation
for such data.
The second way of studying canonical correlation analysis geometrically is
to think of the rows of Z1 and Z2 as z11 , z
1
2 , ....z
1
I and z
2
1 , z
2
2 , ....z
2
I vectors in the
corresponding spaces of dimensionalities J1 and J2 respectively.
Let us define these spaces as Mahalanobis spaces since the metrics imposed
on these ones are defined by the inverses of covariance matrices S−111 and S
−1
22
conventionally called Mahalanobis metrics. The columns S11ak of S11A and
S22bk of S22B of can be considered orthonormal basis vectors in these two
spaces, since: (S11A)
0 S−111 (S11A) = (S11B)
0 S−111 (S11B) = I which is equiva-
lent to standardization (a2.2.3). The coordinates of the rows of Z1 and of Z2
with respect to the canonical axes, S11ak and S22bk respectively, are the cor-
responding vectors of the canonical scores: Z1S
−1
11 (S11ak) = Z1ak = uk and
Z2S
−1
22 (S22bk) = Z2bk = vk.
In the J1 and J2 - dimensional geometries of the rows of Z1 and Z2 re-
spectively the variables are represented as axes with the canonical weights as
coordinates.
We can combine these two viewpoints. From (a2.2.2) and (a2.2.3) we see that
the two sets of coordinates A(k∗) and B(k∗) are related as follows: S
−1
11 S12B(k∗) =
A(k∗)D((k∗)(a2.2.4) S
−1
22 S12A(k∗) = B(k∗)D((k∗)(a2.2.5) where D((k∗) denotes
the k∗ × k∗ diagonal matrix of the first k∗ canonical correlations (1, ...., (k.
7.2.2 GENERALISED CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The generalised canonical correlation analysis (GCCA) describe the correlations
between K data matrices observed for the same n units. The method is a
generalisation of CCA10 and it requires a criterion for measuring the correlation
between K data matrices. The criterion consists in finding canonical variates yj
so that the sum of the squared correlation coeﬃcients between them and each
data matrix is maximum. Let Z = [Z1;Z2; ..;Zq; ..., ZQ] be a n×p matrix which
consists of Q blocks of centred matrices Zq11 , the objective that correspond to
the jth canonical variate can be written as: sj =
PQ
q=1 y
0
jZq
¡
Z0qZq
¢−1
Z0qyj .The
variates yj are determined in order to maximize sj with the constraints of being
normalised and orthogonal to each other: y0jyj = 1 and y
0
iyj = 0 for i 6= j.
The criteria yj are maximum when the canonical variates are eigenvectors
of n× n the matrix S: S = PQq=1 Zq ¡Z0qZq¢−1 Z0q (a3.1).
10The generalization of the method was proposed by Carrol (1968).
11Moreover the columns of Zq should be linearly indipendents.
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7.2.3 MULTICORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS
Let us suppose that Z = [Z1;Z2; ..;Zq; ..., ZQ] is a n × p matrix composed
by Q indicators matrices Zq. Let us define Dq a diagonal matrix of order
n× pq corresponding to the sum of the columns of the matrix Zq. Let us define
D ≡ (Dq) a p× p diagonal matrix which is composed by Q diagonal blocks.
In this case the matrix (a3.1) is equivalent to: S =
PQ
q=1 Zq (Dq)
−1 Z 0q
(a3.1.1) and the maximization problem is sj = y0jSyj with the constraint y
0
jyj =
1. Then the maximization conditions are Syj = λyj and
PQ
q=1 Zq (Dq)
−1 Z0qyj =
λyj (a3.1.2). Since for each h < Q can be written that Z0hyj = uh and
in general that: Zy = u where u is a vector with p components so that
u’=
¡
u01, u
0
2, ...., u
0
h, ..., u
0
Q
¢
.
Multiply both members of (a3.1.2) for Z 0hyj then can be written that for
h = 1, ....Q:
PQ
q=1 Z
0
hZq (Dq)
−1 Z0quq = λuh (a3.1.3). The compact form of the
(a3.1.3) is: Z0ZD−1u = λu
The MCA is (1/q)Z0ZD−1u = λu where λ = qλ The eigenvalues found by
GCCA is q times those found in CCA on the matrix Z.
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